Inforex - ق - و - ح

جيمس J. ستيرانكو مقابل إنفوريكس، إنك. (وحالتان مصاحبتان ملاحظة 1). سوفولك. 16 أبريل 1976. - 29 أبريل 1977 مقاطعة ميدلسكس الحالي: كيفيل، غودمان، أرمسترونج، جي. في دعوى لخرق اتفاق العمل التي تنص على أن تكون مدة عمل الموظفين أدناه لمدة 18 شهرا. وبالنسبة للفترات الإضافية التي قد يكون مقبولا للطرفين، تشير الأدلة إلى أنه بعد انقضاء فترة الثمانية عشر شهرا، استمر الموظف في العمل بنفس المرتب السنوي دون تناقص في مسؤولياته، مما يبرر استنتاج أن الاتفاق قد تم تجديده من سنة إلى . 260-262 في دعوى لخرق اتفاق العمل، فإن الأدلة على أن المسؤوليات التنفيذية للموظفين قد سحبها صاحب العمل تدريجيا إلى أن لم يعد يشغل منصبا تنفيذيا تبرر اكتشاف أن رب العمل قد خالف الاتفاق 262-263 استمر الموظف في العمل بقدرة غير متكررة لا يشكل تنازلا عن الإخلال حيث كان تخفيض عدد الموظفين تدريجي، حيث جلب هذا الإجراء بعد أن علم أنه لم يعاد انتخابه نائبا للرئيس 263-265. كما أن إخلال أرباب العمل باتفاق الاستخدام، الذي يتضمن أيضا أحكاما لشراء مخزونات، قد أفسد القيود المفروضة على بيع الأسهم. 266-267 خرق أرباب العمل لاتفاق شراء العمل والأوراق المالية بعنوان الموظف للتعويض عن الأضرار التي لحقت أرباب العمل رفضا خاطئة لإذن الإفراج عن الاتفاقات القيود المفروضة على بيع الأسهم. 267-268 إن إنهاء عقد العمل بسبب إخلال أرباب العمل لا يعفي الموظف من التزامه بتنازل صاحب العمل عن حقوقه في طلب براءة عن بند تم اختراعه بوصفه أحد المسؤوليات الرئيسية للموظفين في عمله. وفي حالة استمرار الموظف في العمل لدى صاحب عمل بعد خرق صاحب العمل لاتفاق عمله إلى أن يخرج من الخدمة، فإنه لا يحق للموظف استرداد التعويضات عن المدة المتبقية من مدة العقد. 270-271 بموجب اتفاق تقييد أسهم الموظفين الذي ينص على أنه يحق لصاحب العمل أن يعيد شراء أسهم بسعر معين إذا كان الموظف قد تم إبراء ذمة سببه، كان يحق لصاحب العمل استرداد تعويضات عن رفض الموظفين إعادة أسهمه بعد إخلاء سبيله. 271-272 إن الأدلة في دعوى ضد ضابط من الشركات للتدخل المتعمد في علاقة تعاقدية مع المؤسسة تبرر استنتاجا بأن إجراءات الضباط لم تكن نتيجة لخداع أو خداع. 272-273 لم يكن المصرف الذي يعمل كوكيل نقل مسؤولا أمام المدعي بسبب رفضه إصدار شهادات الأسهم غير المقيدة حيث أن رفضه إزالة الأساطير التقييدية من أسهم المدعين لا يشكل رفضا لتسجيل التحويل بالمعنى المقصود في المادة زاي. 106، سيكتيون 8-401 (2). 273-275 فواتيرين في حقوق الملكية المقدمة إلى المحكمة العليا في 16 يونيو 1971 و 9 ديسمبر 1971 على التوالي. عقد. وكتب في نفس المحكمة بتاريخ 21 نوفمبر 1973. وحوكمت القضايا أمام ميتشيل، إدوارد R. ليف لجيمس ج. ستيرانكو. إيفان Y. سيمرجيان فور إنفوريكس، Inc. أوثرز. كيفيل، J. هذه هي القضايا الثلاث التي تأتي هنا على الطعون والطعون عبر الأحكام الصادرة في التقاضي الناجمة عن النزاعات فيما يتعلق بالاتفاقات المكتوبة بين صاحب العمل وأحد موظفيها. وجرى توحيد القضايا للمحاكمة أمام قاض من المحكمة العليا يجلس دون هيئة محلفين. أمامنا نسخة من الأدلة، والمعارض العديدة، واستنتاجات القضاة، والأحكام وأحكام الحكم. تم إدخال الأحكام بعد 1 يوليو 1974. وعلينا أن نعطي الاعتبار الواجب للنتائج التي توصل إليها القاضي والتي لن يتم عكسها ما لم يكن واضحا خطأ ولكن قد نجد الحقائق بالإضافة إلى تلك التي وجدها. تايلور ضد لاسيل، 4 الشامل التطبيق. ط. 539. 540 (1976). نلخص الحقائق ذات الصلة على النحو التالي: في 15 يوليو 1968، جيمس ج. ستيرانكو (ستيرانكو)، مهندس معالجة الكمبيوتر والتعبئة والتغليف، وشركة إنفوريكس، وشركة (إنفوريكس)، وهي شركة تعمل في مجال تصميم وتطوير وتصنيع وتسويق والمعدات الطرفية لأجهزة الكمبيوتر، دخلت في اتفاق شراء العمالة والأوراق المالية (اتفاق العمل) واتفاق المساهمين. وينص اتفاق العمل على أن تعمل شركة إنفوريكس بصفتها التنفيذية في شركة ستيرانكو طوال فترة عمله بموجب الاتفاق. وكان هذا المصطلح لمدة ثمانية عشر شهرا تبدأ في 8 يوليو 1968، وللفترات الإضافية التي قد تكون مقبولة من الطرفين. وتبقى راتبه الأساسي البالغ 000 26 دولار في السنة دون تغيير خلال فترة عمله. كما تضمنت اتفاقية العمل أحكاما تتعلق بالتخلص من الأسباب، وتخصيص حقوق البراءات، والمشاركة في خطط حوافز الشركات. وعملا باتفاق الاستخدام اشترت شركة ستيرانكو 8000 سهم من أسهم إنفوريكس المشتركة بسعر دولار واحد للسهم. وتخضع هذه الأسهم للتقييد بعدم بيعها أو رهنها أو نقلها لمدة خمس سنوات بعد تاريخ الاتفاق. وعلاوة على ذلك، رهنا ببعض الاستثناءات، أعطى اتفاق العمل لشركة إنفوريكس خيارا لإعادة شراء أسهم ستيرنكوس خلال فترة الخمس سنوات بسعر دولار واحد للسهم. الملاحظة 2 الملاحظة 3 تم تعديل المادة 12 من اتفاق العمل، الذي يتضمن قيودا على حق ستيرانكوس في بيع مخزونه وأحكام إعادة الشراء من قبل إنفوريكس، في 21 أكتوبر 1968، ومرة ​​أخرى في 22 ديسمبر 1969. تناولت هذه التعديلات حق إنفوريكس لإعادة شراء أسهم ستيرنكوس. وأوضح التعديل الأول أن شركة إنفوريكس لن يكون لها الحق في إعادة شراء أسهم ستيرانكوس إذا تم تصريفها بدون سبب أو إذا لم تقم إنفوريكس بتجديد الاتفاقية بنفس الشروط. وقد حذف التعديل الثاني الحكم الأخير. كان ستيرانكو يعمل لأول مرة بصفته التنفيذية كما هو مطلوب من قبل اتفاقية العمل وحمل لقب نائب رئيس التصنيع حتى 19 مايو 1971. في البداية، شملت واجباته المسؤولية عن تصنيع وتطوير نظام التعبئة والتغليف للمنتجات إنفوريكس . وفي ذلك الوقت، أبلغه موظفون آخرون وخصص له مكتبا مماثلا لمسؤولين آخرين في الشركة. خلال عمله في إنفوريكس، كان ستيرانكو فعالا في تطوير عملية إنفوبوند. اخترع أو شارك في اختراع ثلاثة بنود تم تعيينها من قبل إنفوريكس كما M-258، M-266 و M-297. الملاحظة 4 في عام 1969، عين ستيرانكو حقوقه في الاختراعات، M-258 و -266. وسيناقش في وقت لاحق رأيه في عدم إسناد حقوقه إلى M-297. ابتداء من صيف عام 1970 واستمر في فصل الشتاء من ذلك العام، قدمت اقتراحات من قبل إنفوريكس إلى ستيرانكو أنه ترك إنفوريكس وتصبح موظفا في شركة إنفوبوند المقترحة (إنفوبوند). واقترح أن يستسلم بعض أسهمه في إنفوريكس مقابل الأسهم إنفوبوند. واعتبر أن هذه المقترحات غير عادلة ورفضها لأنه يعتقد أن المخزون الذي سيتم تسليمه يستحق أكثر بكثير من أسهم إنفوبوند التي سيحصل عليها في المقابل. في 22 سبتمبر 1970، تم تعيين ستيرانكو للعمل بدوام كامل على تخطيط الشركات لشركة إنفوبوند المقترحة التي تم تنظيمها في عام 1971 لاستغلال عملية إنفوبوند تجاريا. في ذلك الوقت تم تعيين موظف آخر مسؤول عن التصنيع. ونتيجة لذلك، بعد 22 سبتمبر 1970، لم يعد ستيرانكو الاحتفاظ بمسؤوليات التصنيع السابقة. ولم يحضر بعد ذلك أي اجتماعات للضباط ولم يعد الموظفون يبلغون عنه. في نوفمبر عام 1970، عرض توماس ب. هورغان (هورغان)، رئيس إنفوريكس، ستيرانكو منصب الموظفين في ضمان المنتج. وكان هذا الموقف دون مسؤولية تنفيذية ورفضت ستيرانكو العرض. وفي تشرين الثاني / نوفمبر 1970 أيضا، كان لدى بعض موظفي شركة إنفوريكس بعض أسهمهم من الأسهم الصادرة عن قيود إعادة البيع. كان ستيرانكو هو الضابط الوحيد الذي لم يتم الإفراج عن الأسهم من هذه القيود. في 17 ديسمبر 1970، تم تعيين ستيرانكو منصب مستشار للرئيس المعين من إنفوبوند. وأبلغت شركة ستيرانكو بأنه لم يعد مخولا بإجراء التزامات شراء أو توظيف لشركة إنفوريكس. كما أنه لم يأذن له بالدخول في مفاوضات تجارية بشأن إنفوبوندز. ولم يكن هذا المنصب دون مسؤولية تنفيذية، وبعد ذلك لم يعمل ستيرانكو بصفته التنفيذية. ودخل وأداء الواجبات التي تم تكليفه بها. وبعد ذلك، نقلت مكاتبه مرتين. وكانت المكاتب الجديدة مكاتب داخلية وكانت أصغر وأقل مرغوبة من تلك المخصصة لضباط إنفوريكس الآخرين. وترافقت هذه التحركات مع انخفاض خدمات السكرتارية. في 19 مايو 1971، لم يعاد انتخاب ستيرانكو كنائب لرئيس إنفوريكس. وفي 16 يونيو / حزيران 1971، قدم مشروع قانون للإغاثة الإصلاحية في المحكمة العليا (أول القضايا المعروضة علينا الآن) يزعم فيه أن إنفوريكس قد خرق اتفاق العمل عن طريق خفض رتبته، وأنه قام بإنجازه بصورة بناءة دون سبب. وقد سعى هذا المشروع إلى تقرير ما إذا كان اتفاق الاستخدام لا يزال ملزما للطرفين. بعد تقديم الفاتورة، ظل ستيرانكو في وظيفته حتى خرج من منصبه في نوفمبر 1971. وجد القاضي الاختراع M-297 الذي كان يستخدمه إنفوريكس تجاريا في ربيع عام 1970. وفي 22 يناير 1971، وقد أعدم ستيرانكو و سوينفنتور توكيلا يسمح لشركة إنفوريكس بمقاضاة طلب براءة الاختراع لهذا الاختراع في مكتب الولايات المتحدة للبراءات. وبعد ذلك، وعلى الرغم من الطلبات التي قدمها له إنفوريكس، لم يعهد إلى الشركة بحقوقه في طلب البراءة. ورفض في 5 نوفمبر 1971 تنفيذ المهمة، مشيرا إلى أن التزامه بذلك يتوقف على صحة اتفاق العمل الذي كان بعد ذلك موضوع دعوى معلقة (مشروع قانون للإعلان). في 22 نوفمبر 1971، مجلس إدارة إنفوريكس، نقلا عن ستيرانكوس رفض تنفيذ مهمة M-297، صوت بالإجماع لتصريف له لسبب. الملاحظة 5 ثم أبلغت شركة إنفوريكس شركة ستيرانكو عن نيتها، وفقا للمادة 12 من اتفاقية الاستخدام واتفاق المساهمين، أن تمارس خيارها في 29 نوفمبر 1971 لإعادة شراء أسهمه المقيدة البالغة 26،000 سهم من أسهم إنفوريكس بسعر التكلفة. عندما رفض إعادة بيع الأسهم، جلبت إنفوريكس دعوى في ديسمبر 1971، (الحالة الثانية الآن أمامنا) تسعى إلى عودة الأسهم، وتعيين حقوق براءات الاختراع ستيرانكوس ل M-297 ومختلف أوامر التقييد. ملاحظة 6 في 5 يناير 1972، قدمت ستيرانكو طلبا مكتوبا على إنفوريكس و ستريت ستريت بنك و تروست كومباني (بانك) لإصدار شهادات ل 22،200 من أسهمه بدون أسطورة من القسم 12 تقيد بيعها. وبناء على تعليمات من إنفوريكس، رفض البنك إصدار الشهادات حسب الطلب. في 21 نوفمبر 1973، رفعت ستيرانكو دعوى (وهي ثالث القضايا المعروضة علينا الآن) تسعى، في جملة أمور، إلى التعويض عن إنفوريكس ورفض البنوك إصدار شهادات دون قيود أو تعويضات ضد هورغان بسبب الخوف من إنفوريكس لخرق التوظيف الاتفاق والتسبب في إنفوريكس والبنك لرفض إصدار الشهادات. تم توحيد القضايا، كما ذكر أعلاه، للمحاكمة، وفي 31 يناير 1975، دخل القاضي النتائج والأحكام وأمر بالحكم. وبعد ذلك، صدرت أحكام مماثلة في الحالات الثلاث. الملاحظة 7 في البند 15 من اتفاق الاستخدام، نص الطرفان على وجوب تفسير الاتفاق وتحكمه بقوانين ولاية نيويورك. ويتضمن القسم 7 من اتفاق المساهمين حكما مماثلا. وحيثما أعربت الأطراف عن نية محددة فيما يتعلق بالقانون الناظم، فإن محاكم ماساتشوستس ستدعم خيار الأطراف طالما أن النتيجة لا تتعارض مع السياسة العامة (قارن بين صندوق دولان ضد صندوق الاحتياطي المتبادل 173 ماس 197 197) و ما دامت الدولة المعينة لها علاقة جوهرية بالعقد. انظر ميتنثال ضد ماسكاغني، 183 كتلة 19. 22 (1903) ماكسويل شابيرو وولن Co. Inc. ضد شركة أميروترون 339 الكتلة 252. 257-258 (1959) كوينتين فيسبا Co. Inc. v كونستروكشيون سيرف. 343 ماس 547. 552، n.5 (1962). انظر: سكولز، غودريشس كونفليكت أوف لو's سيكتيون 107 (4th 4th 1964) غرامة، ماساتشوستس كونتراكت كيسس أند بروبلمز إن ذي تشويس أوف لو، 43 ماس. لق 46، 47-50، 54، n.55 (أكتوبر 1958) ثانيا) من تنازع القوانين القسم 187 (1971). وبما أن أي طرف لم يحتج بأن تطبيق قانون نيويورك سيشكل انتهاكا لسياسة ماساتشوستس العامة أو أن نيويورك تفتقر إلى علاقة كبيرة بالعقد، فسوف نفسر الاتفاقات وفقا لقانون تلك الدولة. شروط الاستخدام. في القسم 1 من اتفاقية العمل، وافقت إنفوريكس على توظيف ستيرانكو بصفته التنفيذية طوال فترة عمله: القسم 4 ينص في جزء منه على أن مدة عمل الموظفين أدناه لمدة 18 شهرا تبدأ في 8 يوليو 1968، وبالنسبة ل مثل الفترات الإضافية التي قد تكون مقبولة للطرفين. تزعم إنفوريكس أن مدة صلاحية ستيرانكوس انتهت في 8 يناير 1970، وأنه بعد ذلك لم يعد ملزما بتوظيفه بصفته التنفيذية، وبالتالي فإن إعادة انتدابه في ديسمبر 1970 إلى منصب غير متفرغ لا يشكل خرقا عقد. وفي رأينا أن القاضي حكم على نحو صحيح بأن اتفاق العمل استمر وكان ساري المفعول بكامله من 15 يوليو 1968 حتى 7 يناير 1970، ومن سنة إلى أخرى بعد ذلك. بعد انتهاء فترة الثمانية عشر شهرا في 8 يناير 1970، واصل ستيرانكو العمل لصالح إنفوريكس في نفس الراتب السنوي دون تقليل مسؤولياته. في ربيع عام 1970، بموافقة هورغان، أصبح ستيرانكو مسؤولا عن مراقبة الجودة لشركة إنفوريكس. ومما له أهمية كبيرة أنه لم يبلغ، شفويا أو خطيا، بأن عقده لن يتم تجديده أو لم يتم تجديده. كما لم تسعى إنفوريكس، بموجب المادة 12 من اتفاق الاستخدام، إلى إعادة شراء أي من أسهم ستيرانكوس في غضون ستين يوما من 8 يناير 1970. عندما يتم توظيف واحد لفترة محددة بأجر سنوي ويستمر في نفس الوضع بعد انقضاء المدة، هناك افتراض استمرار علاقة الاستخدام لسنة أخرى بنفس الشروط. آدامز ضد فيتسباتريك، 125 سنة 124، 129 (1891). ماسون ضد نيويورك إنتاج إكسش. 127 التطبيق. شعبة. 282، 285 (1908)، أفد. 196 N. Y.Y 548 (1909). شركة بوهلرز ضد شركة إكسيتر مفغ 52 N. Y.S. 2d 316 (N. Y. سيتي كت 1944). ويمكن أن يؤدي الاستمرار على أساس سنوي إلى أن يكون المصطلح الأصلي لفترة لا تتجاوز سنة واحدة. انظر كارتر ضد برادلي، 245 التطبيق. شعبة. 49 (1935)، أفد. 269 ​​N. Y.Y. 664 (1936) (سنتان) شين ضد العادلة تكس ميلز، وشركة 26 التطبيق. شعبة. 2d 282، 283 (N. Y.Y 1966) (أربعة عشر شهرا) شلايفر ضد كايزر، 84 متفرقات. 2d 817 (سوب. كت 1975)، أفد. 50 التطبيق. شعبة. 2d 749 (N. Y 1976) (سنتان). وقد تم الإعراب عن القاعدة على النحو التالي: القاعدة العامة هي أنه عندما يدخل أحدهم في وظيفة أخرى لفترة محددة بمرتب سنوي محدد، ويستمر العمل بعد تلك الفترة، فإن الافتراض هو استمرار العلاقات لمدة سنة أخرى عند نفس الراتب. شين v. فير-تكس ميلز، Inc. أعلاه، في 283. وكما لاحظنا من قبل، حددت اتفاقية العمل مدة عمل لمدة ثمانية عشر شهرا وفترات إضافية وجدها الطرفان مقبولة. وبما أن الأدلة تبين أن شركة "إنفوريكس" ما زالت تستخدمها شركة إنفوريكس دون اعتراض على ما هو أبعد من المدة المنصوص عليها في اتفاق الاستخدام، فإننا نستنتج من سلوك الطرفين أن التجديد على أساس سنوي قد حدث. نوت 8 شين v. فير-تكس ميلز، Inc. سوبرا. التباين فوستر ضد الأبيض، 253 التطبيق. شعبة. 448، 451، ريفد. 279 N. Y. 38 (1938). ملاحظة 9 الخرق والتنازل. وتقول إنفوريكس بدلا من ذلك أنها لم تخالف عقدها مع ستيرانكو، ولكن حتى لو فعلت ذلك، التنازل عن ستيرانكو الخرق من خلال الاستمرار في العمل ل إنفوريكس وبعد ذلك ل إنفوبوند في قدرة غير متوقعة. كما تدعي شركة إنفوريكس أن التنازل عن انتهاكها "ستيرانكو" لم يفقد أي حقوق كان قد كان قد اضطرها إلى إزالة القيود المفروضة على أسهمه، ولكنه ظل ملزما بتخصيص حقوقه في براءة الاختراع إلى شركة M-297 بموجب اتفاق الاستخدام. الأدلة التي تدعم بشكل عام النتائج الفرعية للقاضي، توضح أن خفض ستيرانكوس من منصبه من نائب الرئيس مع المسؤوليات التنفيذية كان تدريجي يؤدي إلى خرق اتفاق التوظيف من قبل إنفوريكس. وبدأت عملية الاستنزاف التي تعرض لها في وقت مبكر من سبتمبر 1970، عندما كان يعفى من مسؤولياته التصنيع وتعيين للعمل على تخطيط الشركات لشركة إنفوبوند الجنينية. وقد تفاقمت هذه العملية في ديسمبر 1970، من خلال تعيينه في منصب مستشار إنفوبوند دون مسؤوليات تنفيذية وبلغت ذروتها في 19 مايو 1971، عندما لم يعاد انتخابه نائبا لرئيس إنفوريكس. التغيير المادي في واجبات الموظفين أو انخفاض كبير في الرتبة قد يشكل خرقا للعقد الذي يمنح الموظف تعويضات. ماركس v. كودين، 226 N. Y. 138، 146-147 (1919). كاراس ضد مختبرات H. R. وشركة 271 التطبيق. شعبة. 530، 534 (1946)، أفد. 297 N. Y.Y 494 (1947). إنغراسيا ضد شركة شل للنفط 394 واو. 875، 886 (S. D.N. Y.Y. 1975). كونتراست مولينار ضد ويسترن إليك. 525 F. 2d 521، 528 (1st سير. 1975)، سيرت. عرين. 424 الولايات المتحدة 978 (1976). إذا كان الموظف، وهو موظف تنفيذي من الدرجة الأولى، يعمل لملء وظيفة معينة، فإن أي تغيير جوهري في واجباته، أو انخفاض كبير في رتبة، قد يشكل خرقا لاتفاق عمله. وكنتيجة طبيعية ضرورية، فإن الأعمال التي يقوم بها الموظف دفاعا عن حقوقه التعاقدية، أو تأكيدا لمركز أو وظيفة متفق عليها في المؤسسة، ليست عصيان. رودمان v. كوليز كومونيكاتيونس، Inc. 30 N. Y. 2d 1، 10 (1972). بالتأكيد بحلول 19 مايو 1971، عندما توقف عن أن يكون ضابطا في الشركة، كان هناك ما يبرر ستيرانكو في التعامل مع اتفاقية العمل كما تم انتهاكها من قبل إنفوريكس. وقد أدى هذا الحدث إلى تقديم التماسه لإغاثة إعلامية قدمها بعد أقل من شهر. التنازل عن الخرق هو مفهوم راسخ في نيويورك وقانون العقود عموما. ألدين سبيرز سونس Co. v. كاسين Co. أوف أميركا، 122 أب. شعبة. 22، 25-26 (N. YYY 1907). فيرغسون كونتراكتينغ Co. v. ستات، 202 أب. شعبة. 27 (1922)، أفد. 237 م 186 (1923). تومان ضد كلوسون ويلسون شركة 211 التطبيق. شعبة. 507 (N. Y. 1925). ويليستون، كونتراكتس سيكتيون 688 (3d إد 1961). ومع ذلك، على الحقائق المعروضة هنا، ونحن لا نجد أن ستيرانكو التنازل عن الخرق من قبل إنفوريكس. وعلى النقيض من حالات نيويورك التي استشهد بها إنفوريكس والتي واصل الطرف المصاب أداءها بعد خروقات نهائية للعقود التجارية (ألدين، أعلاه فيرغسون، فوق طومان، أعلاه)، من الواضح أن إنفوريكس سحبت ستيرانكوس المسؤوليات التنفيذية والبدائل في بت و قطع. الملاحظة 10 نظرا للطبيعة الجزئية لخفض رتبته والغموض الذي يتسم به المنصب التنفيذي للمصطلح التعاقدي، كان من الصعب على شركة ستيرانكو أن تتحقق بيقين في أي وقت من الأوقات في أواخر 1970 وأوائل 1971 أن عقده قد انتهك. ولكن عندما علم في أيار / مايو 1971، أنه لم يعاد انتخابه نائبا للرئيس، وهو مؤشر قوي على أنه لم يعد يشغل منصبا تنفيذيا مع إنفوريكس، فإنه بدأ دون إبطاء رفع دعوى لإعلان حقوقه بموجب اتفاق العمل. وكانت هذه الدورة متسقة مع الموقف الهش الذي كان عليه أن يتحمله. وقد أثبت اللجوء إلى التقاضي تحديا للتغيير في الوضع الذي فرضه إنفوريكس عليه (قارن شركة التسجيل الأوتوماتي المتحدة ضد وايت، 272 ف. 545، 551 8th سير 1921) دون المساس بملكيته القيمة والمهددة لأسهم الشركة . ملاحظة 11 إن قرار محكمة الاستئناف في نيويورك في قضية رودمان ضد شركة كوليز كومونيكاتيونس، Inc. أعلاه، يعزز استنتاجنا. في رودمان، وقعت ما يلي: في سبتمبر 1966، رودمان، بعد أن باعت شركة نشره إلى كوليز مقابل الأسهم، والعمل في منصب تنفيذي كبير مع كوليز ومسؤولية إعداد نفس النوع من الكتب المدرسية التي كانت شركته قد اكتشف أن عددا كبيرا من الموظفين في مكتب كولز المركزي كان ينقح الكتب التي كتبها. واعترض والتقى كبار المسؤولين التنفيذيين كولز لمناقشة موقفه. وفي أواخر أيلول / سبتمبر وأوائل تشرين الأول / أكتوبر، رفض قبول سلسلة القيادة التنظيمية التي فرضها كوليز والتي أخلت به إلى مستوى تنفيذي متوسط. ومع ذلك، في 30 أكتوبر، انتقل من مكاتبه القديمة التي كان يعد الكتب المدرسية لمكتب كوليز المركزي، لكنه لم يعط أي واجبات حقيقية أو الموظفين. ورفض قبول التعليمات من صغار المديرين التنفيذيين كولز الذين كان في المرتبة أعلاه له على الهيكل التنظيمي للشركة. وفي 14 ديسمبر / كانون الأول، أعاد تأكيد ادعائه لدوره الموعود في الشركة. في 12 يناير / كانون الثاني، بعد أربعة أشهر من علمه لأول مرة عن دوره المتناقص، خرج من منصبه. ولم تناقش المحكمة، لدى احتجازها لرودمان بشأن مسألة التفريغ غير المشروع، مسألة ما إذا كان رودمان قد تنازل عن حقه في المطالبة بخرق العقد بعدم الاستقالة عندما واجه لأول مرة وضعه المتغير في المؤسسة. ولكن المحكمة رأت أن كوليز لا يستطيع أن يضع رودمان في حالة من التجميد العميق حتى يتم استفزازه في عصيان جسيم من الأوامر بأن تصريف العصيان سيكون معقولا. هوية شخصية. في 12. نجد حالة ستيرانكوس لتكون مماثلة لتلك التي من رودمان. سلوك ستيرانكوس في سياق خفضه التدريجي من وضعه التنفيذي يتألف، كما فعل رودمانز، من كل من القبول والاحتجاج. ولم يكن من الممكن الدفاع عن الموقف الذي قام به صاحب العمل من قبله، ومن وجهة نظرنا، من خلال تقديمه مشروع قانون للإعلان في حزيران / يونيه 1971، أكد على نحو كاف حقه في رفع دعوى بسبب الإخلال. ووجد القاضي وحكم بأن القيود المفروضة على نقل المخزون في القسم 12 من اتفاق العمل ظلت سارية حتى 15 يوليو 1973، على الرغم من استنتاجه السابق والحكم بأن خفض رتبة ستيرانكو يشكل خرقا للعقد من قبل إنفوريكس. غير أن القاضي لم يكشف عن أسباب استنتاجه أن القيود استمرت بعد تخفيض الرتبة. ولم يذكر، على سبيل المثال، حجة إنفوريكس أن القيود المفروضة على القسم 12 كانت قابلة للكسر عن بقية الاتفاق (وبالتالي ظلت دون تغيير من قبل الشركة خرق) بموجب المادة 14، التي تنص على ما يلي: في حالة أي واحد أو يجب أن يكون المزيد من أحكام هذا الاتفاق باطلا أو غير قانوني أو غير قابل للتنفيذ بأي شكل من الأشكال، لا يمكن بأي حال من الأحوال أن تتأثر صحة أو عدم قانونية أو عدم قابلية إنفاذ الأحكام المتبقية الواردة في هذه الاتفاقية أو تنخفض قيمتها. ونرى أن استنتاج القضاة كان خطأ. ونجد أنه من غير المعقول أن يكون الحكم الوارد في المادة 14، الذي يحمي البنود المتبقية من عقد ما عندما يعلن أن أحد الأحكام غير قانوني أو غير قابل للتنفيذ، يمكن أن يساعد أيضا على حماية شرط من قبيل المادة 12 عندما ينتهك العقد ككل. وتقول إنفوريكس إن أحد أغراض القيود الواردة في القسم 12 هو تجنب منح الموظفين الذين تم تصريفهم دون أن يكون لهم ميزة غير عادلة على الموظفين الذين لم يخرجوا من الخدمة ولكنهم قد يرغبون في تغيير وظائفهم ولكن لقيود الأسهم. بيد أن هذه الحجة تتجاهل حقيقة أن موظفا مثل ستيرانكو، الذي حرم من الاستفادة من صفقته (أي منصب تنفيذي)، ينبغي أن يعامل معاملة مختلفة عن الموظف الذي كان غير راض عن وظيفته. البناء الذي حث علينا من قبل إنفوريكس وضع واحد في موقف ستيرانكوس تماما في نزوة الشركة لأن الشركة يمكن أن تلغي تعسفا حقوقه التعاقد عن طريق خفض رتبته وما زالت فرض قيود الأسهم. ويمكن إجبار المدير التنفيذي الذي زاد رصيده من حيث القيمة على قبول وضع أدنى من ضمانه التعاقدي أو الإقلاع عن حقه والتخلي عن رصيده القيم. وقد سعت محاكم نيويورك إلى تجنب تفسير العقود بطريقة تضع أحد الطرفين تحت رحمة الطرف الآخر. كارتر ضد برادلي، 245 التطبيق. شعبة. عند 50 (تفسير شرط في عقد عمل يسمح لصاحب العمل بفصل الموظف لأي سبب من الأسباب إلى طلب أساس معقول). انظر رافع ضد هيندين، 29 التطبيق. شعبة. 2d 481، 484، 485، أفد. 23 N. Y. 2d 759 (1968) كرين v. بيرفيكت فيلم تشيم. شركة 38 التطبيق. شعبة. 2d 288، 291 (1972)، أفد. اسم فرعي. كرين v. كادينس إندوس. Inc. 32 N. Y. 2d 718 (1973) سينكوف بيفيراج Co. Inc. v. جوزيف سكليتز بريوينغ Co. 51 ميسك. 2d 446، 448 (N. Y. سوب. كت 1966) ليفي v. سافير، 83 ميسك. 2d 146، 147 (N. Y. سوب. كت 1975). وبناء على ذلك، نرى أن خرق اتفاق إنفوركس من جانب شركة إنفوريكس قد أفسد القيود المفروضة بموجب المادة 12 على 000 24 سهم من أسهم شركة ستيرانكوس، وأحق له إلغاء الأساطير التقييدية من شهاداته. ملاحظة 12 ومع ذلك، فإننا نرى أن القيود المفروضة على ستيرانكوس المتبقية من 2000 سهم التي فرضها اتفاق تقييد الأسهم الموظف (انظر n.2، أعلاه) لم تكن جزءا من اتفاق العمل، وبالتالي ظلت سارية المفعول حتى 8 يوليو 1973، على الرغم من خرق. وبعد أن خلص إلى أن الإخلال من قبل إنفوريكس بعنوان ستيرانكو أن القيود المفروضة على 24،000 سهم من أسهمه إزالة، والسؤال الآخر هو ما إذا كان يحق له أيضا إلى الأضرار الناجمة عن انخفاض قيمة السهم. وبموجب قانون نيويورك يحق لشركة ستيرانكو الحصول على أداء محدد وأضرار على حد سواء بسبب رفض إنفوريكس غير المشروع للافراج عن القيود. ريسين v. ناتيونال كومبيوتر أناليستس، Inc. 62 ميسك. 2d 605، 609 (سوب. كت 1970)، تعديل، 37 التطبيق. شعبة. 2d 952 (N. Y. 1971). كونترا، ثورنبورغ ضد العزبة المعادن شركة 32 كولو. التطبيق. 299، 301 (1973)، أفد. (184) كولو 141 (1974). قياس الأضرار هو الفرق بين سعر السوق في وقت رفض إنفوريكس غير المشروع، أو في غضون هذا الوقت المعقول بعد ذلك كما ستيرانكو قد باعت الأسهم، وسعر السوق في وقت المحاكمة. الملاحظة 13 ريسكين، 62 متفرقات. 2d في 609، 37 التطبيق. شعبة. 2d في 952. هنا أرسلت ستيرانكو طلبا مكتوبا إلى إنفوريكس والبنك لإصدار شهادات دون قيود على النقل في 5 يناير 1972، ل 22200 سهم. في 7 يناير 1972، نصحت شركة إنفوريكس ستيرانكو بأنها أصدرت تعليمات إلى البنك برفض طلبه. وهكذا، وبموجب قانون نيويورك، كان يحق لشركة ستيرانكو الحصول على أعلى قيمة مؤقتة من 22200 سهم من الأسهم بين 7 يناير 1972، وبعد وقت معقول بعد ذلك، ناقصا قيمة الأسهم وقت المحاكمة. الملاحظة 14 إذا كانت الحقائق الأساسية لرفض الإفراج عن القيود لا جدال فيها، فإن ما يشكل وقتا معقولا هو مسألة قانونية للقاضي. كولت v. أوينز، 90 N. Y.Y 368، 371 (1882). رايت ضد بنك المتروبوليس، 110 ن. 237، 249 (1888). انظر ماير v. مونزو، 221 N. Y.Y 442، 446-447 (1917) أنوت. 31 A. L.R. 3d 1332-1334 (1970). ونترك الأمر أمام المحكمة الابتدائية لتحديد الأضرار بموجب الصيغة التي وصفناها. ستيرانكوس M-297 حقوق براءات الاختراع. وبعد أن وجد القاضي أي يد غير نظيفة من جانب الشركة كان من شأنه أن يحظر أداء محددا بموجب المادة 7 من اتفاق الاستخدام، أمر القاضي ستيرانكو بتعيين حقوقه في براءات الاختراع من طراز إم - 297 لشركة إنفوريكس. ومع ذلك، نرى أن اتفاق العمل لم يعد ساري المفعول في تشرين الثاني / نوفمبر 1971، رفض ستيرانكو تنفيذ المهمة. وقد أشار عمل ستيرانكوس لإعلان حقوقه بموجب اتفاق الاستخدام الذي صدر في حزيران / يونيه 1971 بعد تخفيضه في أيار / مايو، إلى إدراكه بأن شركة إنفوريكس قد خرقت الاتفاق ورغبته في إلغاء ذلك الاتفاق والتخفيف من شروطه. وكما أكد ستيرانكو، بسبب حالة عدم التيقن من حقوقه والتزاماته بموجب شروط تقييد الأسهم، استمر في توظيف إنفوريكس-إنفوبوند بصفة غير متكررة لحماية حقوقه في المخزون. ووجدنا أنه بعد 19 مايو 1971، لم يعد عمله محكوما باتفاق العمل ولكن كان على أساس الإرادة. انظر شركة لينسكوت ضد ميلرس فولز Co. 316 F. سوب. 1369، 1373 (D. ماس 1970)، أفد. 440 F. 2d 14 (1st سير.)، سيرت. عرين. 404 U. S. 872 (1971). ومع ذلك، فإن إنهاء اتفاق الاستخدام لا يعفي تلقائيا شركة ستيرانكو من التزامه بتعيين حقوقه في M-297. ويقر قانون هذا الاختصاص بأنه حتى في حالة عدم وجود أحكام محددة للعقد، يحق لصاحب العمل الحصول على اختراعات الموظفين المعينين لتوجيه البحوث الابتكارية أو الانخراط فيها. هويت ضد كوربورون، 268 الشامل 544. 548 (1929). الوطني ديف. ضد غراي، 316 كتلة 240. 247 (1944). انظر بف المجموعة، وشركة ضد كونترولس، وشركة 3 الشامل التطبيق. ط. 735 (1975). في حين أن الموظف الذي تم تعيينه بصفة عامة، قد يحتفظ بحق الملكية في الاختراعات التي يتم تطويرها أثناء وجوده في أي شخص يعمل، إذا كان قد تم توظيفه كمخترع أو توجيه خلال فترة عمله لتطوير أو استكمال آلات أو عمليات جديدة أو حالية، يصبح صاحب العمل مالكا للاختراعات الناتجة ويجوز إجبار احالة براءات الاختراع المأخوذة باسم الموظفين. انظر هويت، أعلاه، في 548-549. الوطني ديف. شركة سوبرا. الملاحظة 15 في حالة الانتخاب للاستمرار على أساس الإرادة، ظل "ستيرانكو" ملزما بإحالة حقوقه في مجال براءات الاختراع M-297 غير المشمولة بالاتفاق، ولكن بموجب مبادئ الخدمة العامة للقانون العام، نظرا إلى أن عملية إنفوبوند، 297 كان جزءا من مسؤولياته الرئيسية. الملاحظة 16 الأضرار المتعلقة بالمرتبات المفقودة. ووجد القاضي وحكم بأنه بما أن شركة ستيرانكو لم تفرغ في تشرين الثاني / نوفمبر 1971 بسبب سببه المحدد في اتفاق العمل فإنه يحق له الحصول على 500 3 راتب كان قد حصل عليه لو استمرت وظيفته في حساب مدة العقد الاتفاق. ومقياس الأضرار الناجمة عن الإخلال بالعقد مسألة موضوعية لا مسألة إجرائية، كما أن قراره يحكمه قانون نيويورك. انظر أتوود ضد ووكر، 179 الكتلة 514. 518-519 (1901). وكما لاحظنا من قبل، فإن خرق اتفاق إنفوركس هو عملية تدريجية بلغت ذروتها بقرار 19 مايو 1971، وليس لإعادة تعيين نائب رئيس ستيرانكو. وكان الخرق في ذلك الوقت قد حمله على التعويض عن الأضرار التي قاسها باقي راتبه حتى 7 يناير / كانون الثاني 1972، ويخضع للاضطلاع بواجب فعلي لجعل الجرح ممكنا قدر الإمكان. هاميلتون ضد مكفيرسون، 28 سنة 72، 77 (1863). ويلموت v. ستات، 32 N. Y. 2d 164، 168 (1973). ولو كان قد استقال في مايو / أيار أو يونيو / حزيران 1971، كان سيظل ملزما بالبحث عن عمل آخر للتخفيف من الأضرار. وقال إنه لا يمكن أن يجلس مكتوف الأيدي بتوقع تحصيل راتبه لما تبقى من المدة التي يحكمها الاتفاق. مكليلاند ضد كليماكس هوسيري ميلز، 252 N. Y.Y 347، 358-359 (1930) (كاردوزو، C. J. كونكوردينغ). بيغز v. دوغيرتي أوفيرزيس، Inc. 287 F. 2d 80، 83 (2d سير. 1961). Although he was neither obliged to accept reemployment from Inforex in a lesser capacity (22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages Section 72, 1965 Annot. 44 A. L.R. 3d 629, 636 1972) nor to continue in his original position under degrading circumstances (Teich v. Aetna Indus. Corp. 8 N. Y. 2d 766, 767 1960), Steranko elected to continue to work for Inforex-Infobond in a nonexecutive capacity following the breach. As stated earlier, under common law principles, Inforex was entitled to the assignment of Sterankos M-297 patent rights and upon his refusal to assign them, his discharge by Inforex was warranted. Therefore, he may not successfully argue now that he is entitled to damages for lost salary. Note 17 He will not be heard to say that the loss of wages from then on shall be deemed the jural consequence of the earlier discharge. He has broken the chain of causation, and loss resulting to him thereafter is suffered under his own act. McClelland, supra, at 359. We conclude that because Steranko failed in his duty to mitigate damages the judges award of 3,500 was error. Damages for Inforex. As stated earlier, 2,000 of Sterankos shares which were not part of the employment agreement remained restricted until July 8, 1973, despite the breach of contract by Inforex. Under the employee stock restriction agreement (see n.2, supra) Inforex was entitled to repurchase these shares for twenty-five cents a share within sixty days of Sterankos discharge if Steranko were discharged for cause. Inforex did in fact demand that he return these with his remaining shares on November 29, 1971. Steranko refused. Since in our view Sterankos discharge was justified by his refusal to assign his patent rights to M-297, we hold that under the employee stock restriction agreement he was obligated to turn over the 2,000 shares to Inforex on demand. That agreement provided that it was to be governed by Massachusetts law. Under our law Inforex is entitled to damages for the diminution in value of the stock in addition to specific performance. George v. Coolidge Bank Trust Co. 360 Mass. 635. 641 (1971). The measure is the difference between the fair market value at the time Steranko refused to return the stock (less twenty-five cents a share) and the fair market value on the date judgment shall enter ordering delivery of the 2,000 shares to Inforex. Ibid. We leave it to the trial judge to compute the damages owed Inforex by Steranko and to deduct that sum from the amount owed Steranko by Inforex for its refusal to release the restrictions on 22,200 of his remaining shares. Personal Liability of Horgan. Steranko seeks damages against Horgan individually claiming intentional interference with Sterankos contractual relationship with Inforex. The judge found only that Horgans actions toward Steranko were not a result of malevolence or malice. The judge drew no conclusion from that finding. In the absence of legal justification, intentional interference with a contractual right by a party not privy to the contract is actionable by the party injured. Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Mfrs. Assn. 221 Mass. 554. 559 (1915). Caverno v. Fellows, 300 Mass. 331. 336-337 (1938). Owen v. Williams, 322 Mass. 356. 360 (1948). Backman v. Guiliano, 331 Mass. 231. 232 (1954). M. F. Roach Co. v. Provincetown, 355 Mass. 731. 732 (1969). If such interference is found to be intentional and without justification, it is malicious in law even though it arose from good motives and without express malice. Grammenos v. Zolotas, 356 Mass. 594. 597 (1970), and cases cited. A defendant may escape liability if the interference was privileged as part of his employment responsibilities. See Caverno, supra, at 337 Owen, supra, at 360. This rule has particular force as applied to corporate officers, since their freedom of action directed toward corporate purposes should not be curtailed by fear of personal liability. Avins, Liability for Inducing a Corporation to Breach its Contract, 43 Cornell L. Q. 55, 59 (1957). See Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N. C. 121, 132-134 (1964) Griswold v. Heat, Inc. 108 N. H. 119, 125 (1967) Nola v. Merollis Chevrolet Kansas City, Inc. 537 S. W. 2d 627, 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). However, to the extent that a defendant acts out of actual malevolence or malice, the privilege may be lost. See Holbrook v. Morrison, 214 Mass. 209. 211 (1913) Caverno, supra, at 336-337 Owen, supra, at 360, citing Restatement of Torts Section 766, comment m (1939). Because Horgans behavior toward Steranko occurred in the course of his duties as a corporate officer of Inforex, he enjoyed a qualified privilege against liability for interference with Sterankos contractual relationship with the corporation, subject, however, to defeasance if his conduct emanated from actual malevolence or malice. From our review of the voluminous record before us, we conclude that the judges finding with respect to Horgans conduct was not clearly erroneous and, therefore, that there is no personal liability on Horgans part for interference with Sterankos contractual relationship with the corporation. Liability of State Street Bank and Trust Co. Steranko asserts that under Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), art. 8, G. L.c. 106, Section 8, the bank, acting as transfer agent for Inforex stock, is jointly and severally liable with Inforex for its refusal on Inforexs instructions to remove the restrictions from Sterankos shares. To arrive at this conclusion, Steranko couples two sections of the code, Sections 8-401 (2) Note 18 and 8-406 (1). Note 19 At the outset we note that the purpose of Section 8-406 was to abrogate in situations to which it applies, the common law immunity previously enjoyed by transfer agents against suits for wrongful refusal to transfer stock. See Kenler v. Canal Natl. Bank, 489 F. 2d 482, 485, n.3 (1st Cir. 1973) Welland Inv. Corp. v. First Natl. Bank, 81 N. J. Super. 180, 187 (1963) comment 1 to Section 8-406 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 U. L.A. (Master Ed. 1976). However, we do not agree that the banks refusal to remove the restrictive legends from Sterankos shares qualifies as a refusal to register a transfer under the terms of Section 8-401 (2) so as to subject the bank to liability under Section 8-406 (1). See generally, Kenler, supra, at 485. The removal of the legend is the obvious first step in, and a necessary incident to the contemplated transfer of such stock (ibid.) but it is not the equivalent of the registration of a transfer. In view of our conclusion that this is not a situation to which the UCC applies, the bank retains its common law immunity against suits by injured shareholders. See First Circuit Review, Transfer Agents Liability to a Stockholder as Affected by The Uniform Commercial Code, 9 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 343, 347, n.15 (1975). It strikes us as being unduly harsh to require the bank, as transfer agent, faced with Sterankos request and Inforexs order, to refuse that request at its peril based upon its own determination whether Sterankos demotion or discharge entitled him to release of the restrictions on his shares, and to incur thereby full liability should a court, after litigation and an opportunity for deliberation, rule against the agents decision. See id. at 353. Contra, Comment, 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 1170, 1174 (1964). Thus we hold that Steranko is not entitled to damages from the bank. Note 20 We summarize our rulings as follows: 1. We agree with the judge that the employment agreement continued in effect after January 7, 1970, on a year to year basis. 2. We agree with the judge that Inforex breached its contract by demoting Steranko from his executive position but we hold that the breach occurred over the period of time from September, 1970, to May 19, 1971. 3. We disagree with his ruling that the stock restrictions were severable from the rest of the employment agreement and that they remained in effect despite the breach by Inforex. 4. We rule that Steranko did not waive his right to obtain release of the stock restrictions and that he was entitled to have the restrictions on 24,000 shares removed as a result of the breach. 5. We disagree with the judges conclusion, based on his finding that Steranko would not have sold the stock even if the restrictions had been lifted, that Sterenko was not entitled to damages from Inforex for the latters refusal to release the restrictions. 6. We rule that the damages are the difference between (a) the highest value of 22,200 shares of stock from January 7, 1972, to a reasonable time thereafter and (b) the value of the stock at the time of trial. 7. We find that after Steranko was demoted from his executive position as vice president in May, 1971, he continued to work on an at will basis. 8. We rule that Steranko was obligated, even as an employee at will, to assign his interest in the M-297 patent rights to Inforex, and we rule, although for different reasons than those of the judge, that Inforex is entitled to that assignment. 9. We rule that although Steranko might have been entitled to damages for lost salary had he resigned in May, 1971, his refusal to assign his M-297 patent rights in the context of his continued employment violated his duty to mitigate damages. Consequently, we reverse the judges ruling that Steranko was entitled to 3,500 for lost salary after his discharge in November, 1971. 10. We rule that Inforex is entitled to the return of the 2,000 shares purchased by Steranko under the employee stock restriction agreement as well as damages equal to the difference between the fair market value when Steranko refused to return them (less twenty-five cents a share) and the fair market value on the date judgment shall enter ordering delivery of the 2,000 shares. 11. We accept the judges finding with respect to Horgans conduct and rule that Horgan is not personally liable in damages to Steranko. 12. We rule that the bank is not liable to Steranko for its refusal to issue unrestricted stock certificates. Accordingly, the judgments are reversed and a new judgment is to be entered in each case in part as follows: (1) that the employment agreement remained in full force and effect from July 15, 1968, through January 7, 1970, and annually thereafter until May 19, 1971 (2) that James J. Steranko assign all his right, title and interest in M-297 to Inforex, Inc. (3) that James J. Steranko is the owner of 24,000 shares of Inforex, Inc. stock, free of restrictions imposed by the employment agreement and the stockholders agreement (4) that Inforex, Inc. direct State Bank and Trust Company to remove from the aforesaid shares all such restrictions and to transfer those shares forthwith to James J. Steranko (5) that James J. Steranko transfer to Inforex, Inc. 2,000 shares purchased by him pursuant to the employee stock restriction agreement of June 23, 1969. The cases are remanded to the Superior Court for computation of damages against Inforex consistent with this opinion for its wrongful refusal to authorize removal of the stock restrictions, less damages owed by Steranko for his wrongful refusal to resell his 2,000 shares purchased in accordance with the employee stock restriction agreement. The damages so computed are to be included in the new judgments. No costs are to be awarded to any party. Note 1 The second case is Inforex, Inc. vs. James J. Steranko and State Street Bank and Trust Co. (Steranko filed a counterclaim to this action in which International Business Machines Corp. IBM and Infobond Corp. Infobond were joined as third-party defendants. The counterclaim was dismissed against IBM pursuant to a stipulation of the parties. Infobond appealed from an interlocutory decree overruling its demurrer to Sterankos amended complaint. However, that appeal has not been argued before this court, nor did the judgment entered in the Superior Court make reference to Infobond.) The third case is that of James J. Steranko vs. Thomas B. Horgan, State Street Bank and Trust Company and Inforex, Inc. Note 2 A four-for-one split in April, 1969, increased the number of shares held by Steranko to 32,000. On May 16, 1969, Inforex released 8,000 of these shares from the resale restrictions. On June 23, 1969, Steranko purchased another 2,000 shares subject to similar restrictions set out in an Employee Stock Restriction Agreement, except that the repurchase price for these shares was twenty-five cents a share. Thus Sterankos total acquisition was 34,000 shares of which 26,000 were restricted when this dispute arose. Note 3 Section 12 of the employment agreement provided, inter alia, If, prior to the expiration of said five-year period, the Employee shall leave the employ of the Company for any reason, including without limitation any termination of this Agreement by the Company. but specifically excluding the death or permanent. disability of the Employee attested by competent medical evidence, the Company shall have an option exercisable within sixty days after the severance of such employment to purchase any or all shares of the Stock for a purchase price of 1 per share. All certificates representing shares of the Stock shall bear a legend referring to the restrictions on the transfer and disposition of the Stock and the Companys option to repurchase the Stock set forth in this Section 12. The stockholders agreement provided that if Steranko received a written offer from a third party to purchase his stock, Inforex would have an option to match the offer and repurchase the shares. That agreement was to be in effect for three years, until July 15, 1971. In light of the employment agreement which barred Steranko from selling or transferring his stock for five years, as long as the employment agreement remained in effect the stockholders agreement became ineffectual by the passage of time in the course of this dispute. Note 4 The Infobond process is an automated wiring process for connecting electronic components on a printed circuit board. The process makes use of the M-258, M-266 and M-297 inventions. Note 5 Horgan, the president of Inforex, testified that Sterankos refusal to assign his patent rights to M-297 was the sole reason for his discharge. Note 6 Inforex obtained an order restraining Steranko and the State Street Bank and Trust Company, the transfer agent for the stock, from disposing of or transferring any shares of Inforex stock issued to Steranko. This order was later modified and then dissolved when Inforex failed to post a bond. Note 7 1. That the Employment Agreement aforementioned be declared valid and in full force and effect in its entirety from July 15, 1968 through January 7, 1970. The judgment omitted the additional language of the judges finding and ruling numbered 39 as follows: and from year to year thereafter. 2. That James J. Steranko assign to Inforex all his right, title and interest in M-297. 3. That James J. Steranko be declared the owner of the 26,000 Inforex shares here in issue free of any and all restrictions imposed thereon pursuant to and in accordance with the Employment Agreement of July 15, 1968, the Stockholders Agreement of July 15, 1968, and the Employee Stock Restriction Agreement of June 23, 1969. 4. That Inforex andor the Bank remove from the aforesaid 26,000 shares any and all such restrictions and transfer said shares free and clear of these restrictions to James J. Steranko forthwith. 5. That James J. Steranko recover of Inforex the sum of 3,500.00 with interest thereon as provided by law. 6. No costs of action. Note 8 Inforex argues in effect that the term of employment cannot be renewed or extended by the conduct of the parties because section 17 of the employment agreement states that this Agreement may be amended, terminated or superseded only by an agreement in writing between the Company and the Employee. We hold, however, that a renewal or an extension is beyond the scope of section 17 and therefore need not be in writing. Note 9 Cases relied upon by Inforex are distinguishable. Van Der Veer v. Theile, 185 App. Div. 17 (N. Y. 1918), involved employment for an indefinite period with a qualified promise to guarantee employment for a year. Klein Inst. for Aptitude Testing, Inc. v. Kestin, 34 Misc. 2d 967 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1962), dealt with a contract providing for termination at will after a one-year period. However, the case arose on a motion to dismiss the complaint for legal insufficiency on its face, and did not confront the question whether the facts demonstrated a renewal of the employment agreement. Note 10 The judge found that in September, 1970, when Steranko was assigned to work full time on corporate planning for the proposed Infobond Company, he retained none of his previous manufacturing responsibilities, had no employees reporting to him, and no longer attended officers meetings. According to the judge, the breach occurred in December, 1970, when Steranko was assigned as consultant to the president of Infobond. The judge found that further degradations in Sterankos position occurred after December, 1970: his assignment to less desirable office space, his decreased secretarial services and, eventually, the denial of his reelection as vice president. Note 11 Had he quit, Steranko would have been faced with a dual problem. Not only would it have been his burden to show that he had been constructively discharged prior to his resignation by virtue of the change in his duties in violation of the employment agreement (see Karas v. H. R. Labs. Inc. 271 App. Div. 530 N. Y. 1946 cf. Merrill v. Wakefield Rattan Co. 1 App. Div. 118 N. Y. 1896 Levitz v. Robbins Music Corp. 6 App. Div. 2d 1027 N. Y. 1958 Laiken v. American Bank Trust Co. 34 App. Div. 2d 514 N. Y. 1970 contrast Molinar v. Western Elec. Co. 525 F. 2d 521, 527 1st Cir. 1975), but he would have faced as well the possibility that the court would find the stock limitation provisions of his contract to be severable and thus divest him of the stock despite the breach by Inforex. Note 12 We need not discuss whether the stock restrictions contained in the shareholders agreement were severable from the terms of the employment agreement because the shareholders agreement restrictions expired by their own terms on July 15, 1971, prior to Sterankos formal written demand that the restrictions be removed. Note 13 The trial judge ruled that Steranko was not entitled to any damages because the judge disbelieved Sterankos testimony that he would have sold the stock if the restrictions on the shares had been removed by July 15, 1973, the date on which the judge erroneously held the restrictions to have expired. (See p. 266, supra.) Also the judges finding that Steranko would not have sold his stock prior to July, 1973 (assuming that finding to be relevant to the issue of damages), was clearly erroneous. Sterankos attempts to have the restrictions on transfer removed, his obtaining of a no action letter from the Securities and Exchange Commission to facilitate a transfer, his sales in December, 1971, and January, 1972, of 6,500 shares which had earlier been released, and his testimony that after his discharge he needed capital for a new business venture are compelling evidence that Steranko would have sold the stock had the restrictions been removed. Note 14 Since it does not appear from the record that Steranko ever formally demanded release of the restrictions on the remainder of his shares, he is limited to damages on 22,200 shares. Note 15 Since New York law applies in this case only to the employment agreement and the stockholders agreement between Steranko and Inforex, Massachusetts law governs the resolution of an employers common law rights to inventions of his employees. New York law, however, would appear to compel the same result. Annin v. Wren, 8 N. Y. St. Rep. 852 (Sup. Ct. 1887). Cahill v. Regan, 5 N. Y. 2d 292, 296 (1959). Note 16 Cf. Jamesbury Corp. v. Worcester Valve Co. Inc. 443 F. 2d 205, 214 (1st Cir. 1971), which holds that common law principles are superseded when inventive rights are allocated by contract. But here, following Inforexs breach, when Steranko continued to work on an at will basis, common law principles became applicable. Note 17 In view of our conclusion that the employment agreement terminated upon Sterankos not being reelected vice president in May, 1971, the finding and ruling of the judge (numbered 41) that Sterankos discharge in November was not for cause, as defined in the employment agreement, becomes irrelevant. Since Sterankos employment was at will after Inforexs breach of contract, under common law principles Inforex had almost unbridled discretion to discharge him. Linscott v. Millers Falls Co. 316 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Mass. 1970), affd. 440 F. 2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. den. 404 U. S. 872 (1971). See Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404, 1405, 1416 (1967) Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 Va. L. Rev. 481, 482-488 (1976). Cf. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. 114 N. H. 130, 133 (1974). Had Steranko been discharged arbitrarily or maliciously, he might have been absolved of his duty to mitigate damages from Inforexs breach. The justifiable nature of the discharge abrogated his right to damages for that breach. Note 18 Section 8-401 (2), as appearing in St. 1957, c. 765, Section 1, provides: Where an issuer is under a duty to register a transfer of a security the issuer is also liable to the person presenting it for registration or his principal for loss resulting from any unreasonable delay in registration or from failure or refusal to register the transfer. Note 19 Section 8-406(1), as appearing in St. 1957, c. 765, Section 1, provides: Where a person acts as. transfer agent. for an issuer in the registration of transfers of its securities or in the issue of new securities or in the cancellation of surrendered securities. (b) he has with regard to the particular functions he performs the same obligation to the holder or owner of the security and has the same rights and privileges as the issuer has in regard to those functions. Note 20 Contrast Edina State Bank v. Mr. Steak, Inc. 487 F. 2d 640 (10th Cir.), cert. den. 419 U. S. 883 (1974) (transfer agent liable for refusal to transfer where alleged restrictions not noted on stock certificate) Welland, 81 N. J.Super. at 180 (transfer agent liable for refusal to register transfer upon orders of issuer). Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Trial Court Law Libraries. Questions about legal information Contact Reference Librarians. JAMES J. STERANKO vs. INFOREX, INC. (and two companion cases Note 1 ). Suffolk. April 16, 1976. - April 29, 1977 Middlesex County Present: KEVILLE, GOODMAN, ARMSTRONG, JJ. In an action for breach of an employment agreement which provided that the term of the Employees employment hereunder shall be for 18 months. and for such additional periods as may be mutually acceptable, evidence that after the expiration of the eighteen-month period the employee continued to work at the same annual salary without diminution in his responsibilities warranted a finding that the agreement had been renewed on a year to year basis. 260-262 In an action for breach of an employment agreement, evidence that the employees executive responsibilities had been gradually withdrawn by his employer until he no longer held an executive position warranted a finding that the employer had breached the agreement 262-263 the fact that the employee continued to work in a nonexecutive capacity did not constitute a waiver of the breach where the employees demotion was gradual and where he brought this action soon after he learned that he had not been reelected vice president 263-265. An employers breach of an employment agreement, which also contained provisions for purchasing stock, vitiated the agreements restrictions on selling the stock. 266-267 An employers breach of an employment and stock purchase agreement entitled the employee to recover damages for the employers wrongful refusal to authorize release of the agreements restrictions on the sale of stock. 267-268 Termination of an employment agreement because of the employers breach did not relieve the employee of his obligation to assign to the employer his rights in a patent application for an item invented as one of the employees major responsibilities in his employment. 268-270 Where an employee continued to work for an employer after the employer breached their employment agreement until he was discharged for cause, the employee was not entitled to recover damages for the remainder of the term under the agreement. 270-271 Under an employee stock restriction agreement which provided that the employer was entitled to repurchase shares at a certain price if the employee were discharged for cause, the employer was entitled to recover damages for the employees refusal to return his shares after his discharge. 271-272 Evidence in an action against a corporate officer for intentional interference with an employees contractual relationship with the corporation warranted a finding that the officers actions were not a result of malevolence or malice. 272-273 A bank acting as transfer agent was not liable to the plaintiff for its refusal to issue unrestricted stock certificates where its refusal to remove restrictive legends from the plaintiffs shares did not constitute a refusal to register a transfer within the meaning of G. L. c. 106, Section 8-401 (2). 273-275 TWO BILLS in equity filed in the Superior Court on June 16, 1971, and December 9, 1971, respectively. CONTRACT. Writ in the same court dated November 21, 1973. The cases were tried before Mitchell, J. Edward R. Lev for James J. Steranko. Evan Y. Semerjian for Inforex, Inc. others. KEVILLE, J. These are three cases which come here on appeals and cross appeals from judgments entered in litigation resulting from disputes with respect to written agreements between an employer and one of its employees. The cases were consolidated for trial before a Superior Court judge sitting without jury. We have before us a transcript of the evidence, numerous exhibits and the judges findings, rulings and order for judgment. The judgments were entered after July 1, 1974. We are to give due weight to the findings of the judge which will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous but we may find facts in addition to those found by him. Taylor v. Lassell, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 539. 540 (1976). We summarize pertinent facts as follows: On July 15, 1968, James J. Steranko (Steranko), a computer processing and packaging engineer, and Inforex, Inc. (Inforex), a corporation engaged in the design, development, manufacture and marketing of peripheral equipment for computers, entered into an employment and stock purchase agreement (employment agreement) and a stockholders agreement. The employment agreement provided that Steranko was to be employed by Inforex in an executive capacity throughout the term of his employment under the agreement. The term was to be for eighteen months commencing on July 8, 1968, and for such additional periods as may be mutually acceptable. His starting salary of 26,000 per annum remained unchanged during the course of his employment. The employment agreement also embodied provisions concerning discharge for cause, assignment of patent rights, and participation in company incentive plans. Pursuant to the employment agreement Steranko purchased 8,000 shares of Inforex common stock at a dollar a share. These shares were subject to the restriction that they were not to be sold, pledged or transferred for five years following the date of the agreement. Furthermore, subject to certain exceptions, the employment agreement gave Inforex an option to repurchase Sterankos shares within the five-year period at a price of a dollar a share. Note 2 Note 3 Section 12 of the employment agreement, which contained restrictions on Sterankos right to sell his stock and the provisions for repurchase by Inforex, was amended on October 21, 1968, and again on December 22, 1969. These amendments dealt with the right of Inforex to repurchase Sterankos shares. The first amendment made clear that Inforex would not have the right to repurchase Sterankos shares if he were discharged without cause or if Inforex failed to renew the agreement on substantially the same terms. The second amendment deleted the latter provision. Steranko was first employed in an executive capacity as required by the employment agreement and held the title of vice president of manufacturing until May 19, 1971. At the outset, his duties included responsibility for manufacturing and for the development of a packaging system for Inforexs products. At that time other employees reported to him and he was assigned office space comparable to that of other officers of the company. During his employment at Inforex, Steranko was instrumental in the development of the Infobond process. He invented or participated in the invention of three items designated by Inforex as M-258, M-266 and M-297. Note 4 In 1969 Steranko assigned to Inforex his rights to the inventions, M-258 and -266. His failure to assign his rights to M-297 will be discussed later in the opinion. Beginning in the summer of 1970 and continuing into the winter of that year, proposals were made by Inforex to Steranko that he leave Inforex and become an employee of the proposed Infobond corporation (Infobond). It was suggested that he surrender some of his Inforex stock in exchange for Infobond stock. He regarded these proposals as unfair and he rejected them because he believed that the stock to be surrendered was worth much more than the Infobond shares he would receive in return. On September 22, 1970, Steranko was assigned to work full time on corporate planning for the proposed Infobond corporation which was organized in 1971 to exploit the Infobond process commercially. At that time another employee was placed in charge of manufacturing. As a consequence, after September 22, 1970, Steranko no longer retained his previous manufacturing responsibilities. He thereafter attended no officers meetings and employees no longer reported to him. In November, 1970, Thomas B. Horgan (Horgan), the president of Inforex, offered Steranko a staff position in product assurance. This position was without executive responsibility and Steranko rejected the offer. Also in November, 1970, certain Inforex employees had some of their shares of stock released from the resale restrictions. Steranko was the only officer whose stock was not released from these restrictions. On December 17, 1970, Steranko was assigned the position of consultant to the president-designate of Infobond. Steranko was informed that he was no longer authorized to make purchase or employment commitments for Inforex. Nor was he authorized to engage in business negotiations on Infobonds behalf. The position was without executive responsibility and thereafter Steranko was not employed in an executive capacity. He entered upon and performed the duties which were then assigned to him. Thereafter, his offices were moved twice. The new offices were interior offices and were smaller and less desirable than those assigned to other Inforex officers. These moves were accompanied by decreased secretarial services. On May 19, 1971, Steranko was not reelected as a vice president of Inforex. On June 16, 1971, he brought a bill for declaratory relief in the Superior Court (the first of the cases now before us) alleging that Inforex had breached the employment agreement by demoting him and had constructively discharged him without cause. This bill sought a determination whether the employment agreement continued to be binding upon the parties. After bringing the bill, Steranko remained at his job until he was discharged in November, 1971. The invention designated M-297 was found by the judge to have been in commercial use by Inforex in the spring of 1970. On January 22, 1971, Steranko and a coinventor had executed a power of attorney authorizing Inforex to prosecute the patent application for that invention in the United States Patent Office. Thereafter, despite requests made to him by Inforex, he did not assign to the company his rights in the patent application. And, on November 5, 1971, he refused to execute the assignment, stating that his obligation to do so depended upon the validity of the employment agreement which was then the subject of pending litigation (his bill for declaratory relief). On November 22, 1971, the board of directors of Inforex, citing Sterankos refusal to execute the M-297 assignment, voted unanimously to discharge him for cause. Note 5 Inforex then informed Steranko of its intention, pursuant to section 12 of the employment agreement and the stockholders agreement, to exercise its option on November 29, 1971, to repurchase his 26,000 restricted shares of Inforex stock at cost. When he refused to resell the stock, Inforex brought suit in December, 1971, (the second case now before us) seeking the return of the stock, the assignment of Sterankos patent rights to M-297 and various restraining orders. Note 6 On January 5, 1972, Steranko made a written demand upon Inforex and State Street Bank and Trust Company (bank) to issue certificates for 22,200 of his shares without a section 12 legend restricting their sale. On instructions from Inforex, the bank declined to issue the certificates as requested. On November 21, 1973, Steranko brought an action (the third of the cases now before us) seeking, inter alia, damages for Inforexs and the banks refusals to issue certificates without restrictions and for damages against Horgan for maliciously causing Inforex to breach the employment agreement and for causing Inforex and the bank to refuse to issue the certificates. The cases, as stated above, were consolidated for trial and on January 31, 1975, the judge entered findings, rulings and order for judgment. Thereafter, identical judgments were entered in the three cases. Note 7 In section 15 of the employment agreement, the parties provided that the agreement should be construed under and governed by the laws of the State of New York. Section 7 of the stockholders agreement contained a similar provision. Where the parties have expressed a specific intent as to the governing law, Massachusetts courts will uphold the parties choice as long as the result is not contrary to public policy (compare Dolan v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. 173 Mass. 197 1899) and as long as the designated State has some substantial relation to the contract. See Mittenthal v. Mascagni, 183 Mass. 19. 22 (1903) Maxwell Shapiro Woolen Co. Inc. v. Amerotron Corp. 339 Mass. 252. 257-258 (1959) Quintin Vespa Co. Inc. v. Construction Serv. Co. 343 Mass. 547. 552, n.5 (1962). See Scoles, Goodrichs Conflict of Laws Section 107 (4th ed. 1964) Fine, Massachusetts Contract Cases and Problems in the Choice of Law, 43 Mass. L. Q. 46, 47-50, 54, n.55 (Oct. 1958) Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Section 187 (1971). As neither party has argued that application of New York law would violate Massachusetts public policy or that New York lacks substantial relation to the contract we shall interpret the agreements according to the law of that State. Term of Employment. In section 1 of the employment agreement, Inforex agreed to employ Steranko in an executive capacity throughout his term of employment: Section 4 provided in part that the term of the Employees employment hereunder shall be for 18 months commencing on July 8, 1968, and for such additional periods as may be mutually acceptable. Inforex contends that Sterankos term of employment expired on January 8, 1970, that thereafter it was no longer obligated to employ him in an executive capacity and, consequently, that his reassignment in December, 1970, to a nonexecutive position did not constitute a breach of contract. In our view the judge correctly ruled that the Employment Agreement continued and was in effect in its entirety from July 15, 1968 through January 7, 1970, and from year to year thereafter. After the expiration of the eighteen-month period on January 8, 1970, Steranko continued to work for Inforex at the same annual salary without diminution in his responsibilities. In the spring of 1970, with the approval of Horgan, Steranko became responsible for quality control for Inforex. Significantly, he was not informed either orally or in writing that his contract would not be, or had not been, renewed. Nor did Inforex seek, pursuant to section 12 of the employment agreement, to repurchase any of Sterankos stock within sixty days of January 8, 1970. When one has been employed for a definite period at an annual wage and continues in the same position after the expiration of the term, there is a presumption of a continuance of the employment relationship for another year upon the same terms. Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N. Y. 124, 129 (1891). Mason v. New York Produce Exch. 127 App. Div. 282, 285 (1908), affd. 196 N. Y. 548 (1909). Pohlers v. Exeter Mfg. Co. 52 N. Y.S. 2d 316 (N. Y. City Ct. 1944). A continuance on a year to year basis may result even where the original term was for a period other than one year. See Carter v. Bradlee, 245 App. Div. 49 (1935), affd. 269 N. Y. 664 (1936) (two years) Shenn v. Fair-Tex Mills, Inc. 26 App. Div. 2d 282, 283 (N. Y. 1966) (fourteen months) Schlaifer v. Kaiser, 84 Misc. 2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1975), affd. 50 App. Div. 2d 749 (N. Y. 1976) (two years). The rule has been expressed as follows: The general rule is that where one enters the employment of another for a fixed period at a stated annual salary, and the employment continues beyond that period, the presumption is continuance of the relations for another year at the same salary. Shenn v. Fair-Tex Mills, Inc. supra, at 283. As we have already observed, the employment agreement specified a term of employment for eighteen months and for such additional periods as the parties found acceptable. Since the evidence shows that Steranko continued to be employed by Inforex without objection beyond the term set forth in the employment agreement, we conclude from the conduct of the parties that a renewal on a year to year basis occurred. Note 8 Shenn v. Fair-Tex Mills, Inc. supra. Contrast Foster v. White, 253 App. Div. 448, 451, revd. 279 N. Y. 38 (1938). Note 9 Breach and Waiver. Inforex argues alternatively that it did not breach its contract with Steranko, but even if it did, Steranko waived the breach by continuing to work for Inforex and later for Infobond in a nonexecutive capacity. Inforex further contends that by waiving its breach Steranko not only lost any rights he might have had to the removal of the restrictions on his stock but that he continued to be obliged to assign his patent rights to M-297 under the employment agreement. The evidence, which generally supports the subsidiary findings of the judge, makes clear that Sterankos demotion from his position of vice president with executive responsibilities was a gradual one leading to a breach of the employment agreement by Inforex. The process of attrition to which he was subjected commenced as early as September, 1970, when he was relieved of his manufacturing responsibilities and assigned to work on corporate planning for the embryonic Infobond corporation. That process was exacerbated in December, 1970, by his assignment to the position of consultant for Infobond without executive responsibilities and culminated on May 19, 1971, when he was not reelected as vice president of Inforex. A material change in an employees duties or a significant reduction in rank may constitute a breach of contract entitling the employee to damages. Marks v. Cowdin, 226 N. Y. 138, 146-147 (1919). Karas v. H. R. Labs. Inc. 271 App. Div. 530, 534 (1946), affd. 297 N. Y. 494 (1947). Ingrassia v. Shell Oil Co. 394 F. Supp. 875, 886 (S. D.N. Y. 1975). Contrast Molinar v. Western Elec. Co. 525 F. 2d 521, 528 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. den. 424 U. S. 978 (1976). If an employee, a fortiori an executive employee, is engaged to fill a particular position, any material change in his duties, or significant reduction in rank, may constitute a breach of his employment agreement. As a necessary corollary, acts done by the employee in defense of his contract rights, or in assertion of an agreed status or function in the enterprise, are not insubordination. Rudman v. Cowles Communications, Inc. 30 N. Y. 2d 1, 10 (1972). Certainly by May 19, 1971, when he ceased to be an officer of the corporation, Steranko was warranted in treating the employment agreement as having been breached by Inforex. That event gave rise to his petition for declaratory relief which he brought less than a month thereafter. Waiver of breach is an established concept in New York and in contract law generally. Alden Speares Sons Co. v. Casein Co. of America, 122 App. Div. 22, 25-26 (N. Y. 1907). Ferguson Contracting Co. v. State, 202 App. Div. 27 (1922), affd. 237 N. Y. 186 (1923). Thuman v. Clawson Wilson Co. 211 App. Div. 507 (N. Y. 1925). Williston, Contracts Section 688 (3d ed. 1961). However, on the facts presented here, we do not find that Steranko waived the breach by Inforex. In contrast to the New York cases cited by Inforex in which the injured party continued to perform after definitive breaches of commercial contracts (Alden, supra Ferguson, supra Thuman, supra), it is clear that Inforex withdrew Sterankos executive responsibilities and perquisites in bits and pieces. Note 10 Because of the piecemeal nature of his demotion and the ambiguity of the contractual term executive position, it was difficult for Steranko to realize with certainty at any point during late 1970 and early 1971 that his contract had been breached. But when he learned in May, 1971, that he had not been reelected vice president, a solid indication that he no longer retained an executive position with Inforex, he proceeded without delay to file suit for a declaration of his rights under the employment agreement. This course was consistent with the tenuous position which he had been obliged to assume. His resort to litigation evidenced a challenge to the change in status which Inforex had imposed upon him (compare United Autographic Register Co. v. Wight, 272 F. 545, 551 8th Cir. 1921) without jeopardizing his valuable but threatened ownership of company stock. Note 11 The decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Rudman v. Cowles Communications, Inc. supra, reinforces our conclusion. In Rudman, the following took place: In September, 1966, Rudman, after having sold his publishing company to Cowles in exchange for stock, employment in a senior executive position with Cowles and the responsibility of preparing the same kind of textbooks which his company had been publishing, discovered that a large staff in Cowles central office was heavily revising books which he had written. He objected and met with senior Cowles executives to discuss his position. In late September and early October, he refused to accept the organizational chain of command imposed by Cowles which relegated him to an intermediate executive level. However, on October 30, he moved from his old offices in which he had been preparing textbooks to Cowles central office, but he was given no real duties or staff. He refused to accept instructions from junior Cowles executives who had been ranked above him on the companys organizational chart. On December 14, he restated his claim to his promised role in the company. On January 12, four months after he first learned of his diminished role, he was discharged. The court, in holding for Rudman on the question of wrongful discharge, did not discuss the question whether Rudman had waived his right to claim breach of contract by not resigning when first confronted with his altered status in the corporation. But, the court held that Cowles could not put Rudman into a state of deep-freeze until he was provoked into such gross disobedience of orders that a discharge for insubordination would be plausible. هوية شخصية. at 12. We find Sterankos situation to be analogous to that of Rudman. Sterankos conduct in the course of his gradual demotion from his executive status consisted, as did Rudmans, of both acquiescence and protest. The position into which he was maneuvered by his employer was untenable and in our view, by bringing his bill for declaratory relief in June, 1971, he adequately asserted his right to sue for breach. The judge found and ruled that the restrictions on stock transfer in section 12 of the employment agreement remained in effect until July 15, 1973, despite his earlier finding and ruling that the demotion of Steranko constituted a breach of contract by Inforex. The judge, however, did not disclose his reasons for concluding that the restrictions continued after the demotion. He made no mention, for example, of the argument of Inforex that the section 12 restrictions were severable from the rest of the agreement (and thus remained unaltered by the companys breach) by virtue of section 14, which states: In case any one or more of the provisions of this Agreement should be invalid, illegal or unenforceable in any respect, the validity, legality and unenforceability of the remaining provisions contained herein shall not in any way be affected or impaired thereby. We hold that the judges conclusion was error. We find it hardly credible that a provision like section 14, which protects the remaining clauses of a contract when one clause is declared illegal or unenforceable, can also serve to shield a clause such as section 12 when the contract as a whole has been breached. Inforex argues that one purpose of the section 12 restrictions was to avoid giving employees who were discharged without cause an unfair advantage over employees who were not discharged but who might have wanted to change jobs but for the stock restrictions. That argument, however, ignores the fact that an employee such as Steranko, who was deprived of the benefit of his bargain (i. e. an executive position), should be treated differently from an employee who was merely unhappy with his job. The construction urged upon us by Inforex would place one in Sterankos position totally at the whim of the company because the company could arbitrarily abrogate his contract rights by demoting him and still enforce the stock restrictions. An executive whose stock had increased in value could be coerced into accepting either a position inferior to his contractual guarantee or quitting and forfeiting his valuable stock. The courts of New York have sought to avoid construing contracts in a way that would place one of the parties at the mercy of the other. Carter v. Bradlee, 245 App. Div. at 50 (interpreting a clause in a term employment contract allowing employer to dismiss employee for any reason to require a reasonable ground). See Rafe v. Hindin, 29 App. Div. 2d 481, 484, 485, affd. 23 N. Y. 2d 759 (1968) Crane v. Perfect Film Chem. Corp. 38 App. Div. 2d 288, 291 (1972), affd. sub nom. Crane v. Cadence Indus. Inc. 32 N. Y. 2d 718 (1973) Sinkoff Beverage Co. Inc. v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. 51 Misc. 2d 446, 448 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) Levey v. Saphier, 83 Misc. 2d 146, 147 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). Consequently, we hold that the breach of the employment agreement by Inforex vitiated the restrictions under section 12 on 24,000 shares of Sterankos stock and entitled him to have the restrictive legends removed from his certificates. Note 12 We hold, however, that the restrictions on Sterankos remaining 2,000 shares imposed by the employee stock restriction agreement (see n.2, supra) were not part of the employment agreement and thus remained in effect until July 8, 1973, despite the breach. Having concluded that the breach by Inforex entitled Steranko to have the restrictions on 24,000 shares of his stock removed, a further question is whether he is entitled as well to damages for the decline in value of the stock. Under New York law Steranko is entitled to both specific performance and damages for Inforexs wrongful refusal to authorize release of the restrictions. Riskin v. National Computer Analysts, Inc. 62 Misc. 2d 605, 609 (Sup. Ct. 1970), modified, 37 App. Div. 2d 952 (N. Y. 1971). Contra, Thornburg v. Homestead Minerals Corp. 32 Colo. App. 299, 301 (1973), affd. 184 Colo. 141 (1974). The measure of damages is the difference between the market price at the time of Inforexs wrongful refusal, or within such reasonable time thereafter as Steranko might have sold the stock, and the market price at the time of the trial. Note 13 Riskin, 62 Misc. 2d at 609, 37 App. Div. 2d at 952. Here Steranko sent a written demand to Inforex and the bank to issue certificates without transfer restrictions on January 5, 1972, for 22,200 shares. On January 7, 1972, Inforex advised Steranko that it had instructed the bank to refuse his demand. Thus under New York law, Steranko was entitled to the highest interim value of the 22,200 shares of the stock between January 7, 1972, and a reasonable time thereafter, less the value of the stock at the time of trial. Note 14 Where the essential facts of the refusal to release the restrictions are undisputed, what constitutes a reasonable time is a question of law for the judge. Colt v. Owens, 90 N. Y. 368, 371 (1882). Wright v. Bank of the Metropolis, 110 N. Y. 237, 249 (1888). See Mayer v. Monzo, 221 N. Y. 442, 446-447 (1917) Annot. 31 A. L.R. 3d 1332-1334 (1970). We leave it to the trial court to determine the damages under the formula we have described. Sterankos M-297 Patent Rights. Having found no unclean hands on the part of the corporation which would have barred specific performance under section 7 of the employment agreement, the judge ordered Steranko to assign his M-297 patent rights to Inforex. However, in our view, the employment agreement was no longer in force when in November, 1971, Steranko refused to execute the assignment. Sterankos action for a declaration of his rights under the employment agreement brought in June, 1971, following his demotion in May, indicated his awareness that Inforex had breached the agreement, his desire to rescind that agreement and to be relieved from its terms. As Steranko has asserted, because of the uncertain status of his rights and obligations under the stock restriction clauses, he continued in the employ of Inforex-Infobond in a nonexecutive capacity to protect his rights to the stock. We find that after May 19, 1971, his employment was no longer governed by the employment agreement but was on an at will basis. See Linscott v. Millers Falls Co. 316 F. Supp. 1369, 1373 (D. Mass. 1970), affd. 440 F. 2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. den. 404 U. S. 872 (1971). However, the termination of the employment agreement did not automatically relieve Steranko of his obligation to assign his rights to M-297. The law of this jurisdiction recognizes that even in the absence of specific contract provisions an employer may be entitled to the inventions of employees hired to direct or to engage in inventive research. Hoyt v. Corporon, 268 Mass. 544. 548 (1929). National Dev. Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240. 247 (1944). See BBF Group, Inc. v. Kontrols, Inc. 3 Mass. App. Ct. 735 (1975). While an employee, who was hired in a general capacity, may retain title to inventions developed while in anothers employ, if he was either hired as an inventor or directed during the course of his employment to develop or perfect new or existing machinery or processes, his employer becomes the owner of resulting inventions and may compel the assignment of patents taken in the employees name. See Hoyt, supra, at 548-549. National Dev. Co. supra. Note 15 In electing to continue on an at will basis, Steranko remained obligated to make the assignment of his M-297 patent rights not under the agreement but under common law master-servant principles, since the development of the Infobond process of which M-297 was a part was one of his major responsibilities. Note 16 Damages for Lost Salary. The judge found and ruled that since Steranko was not discharged in November, 1971, for cause, as defined in the employment agreement, he was entitled to 3,500, the salary which he would have earned had his employment continued for the balance of the term under the agreement. The measure of damages for breach of contract being a substantive rather than a procedural matter, its determination is also governed by the law of New York. See Atwood v. Walker, 179 Mass. 514. 518-519 (1901). As we have already observed, the breach of the employment agreement by Inforex was a gradual process culminating in the decision on May 19, 1971, not to reappoint Steranko vice president. The breach at that point entitled him to damages measured by the remainder of his salary through January 7, 1972, subject to an active duty of making reasonable exertions to render the injury as light as possible. Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N. Y. 72, 77 (1863). Wilmot v. State, 32 N. Y. 2d 164, 168 (1973). Had he resigned in May or June, 1971, he would still have been obligated to seek other employment to mitigate damages. He could not sit idly by with the expectation of collecting his salary for the remainder of the term governed by the agreement. McClelland v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N. Y. 347, 358-359 (1930) (Cardozo, C. J. concurring). Beggs v. Dougherty Overseas, Inc. 287 F. 2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1961). Although he was neither obliged to accept reemployment from Inforex in a lesser capacity (22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages Section 72, 1965 Annot. 44 A. L.R. 3d 629, 636 1972) nor to continue in his original position under degrading circumstances (Teich v. Aetna Indus. Corp. 8 N. Y. 2d 766, 767 1960), Steranko elected to continue to work for Inforex-Infobond in a nonexecutive capacity following the breach. As stated earlier, under common law principles, Inforex was entitled to the assignment of Sterankos M-297 patent rights and upon his refusal to assign them, his discharge by Inforex was warranted. Therefore, he may not successfully argue now that he is entitled to damages for lost salary. Note 17 He will not be heard to say that the loss of wages from then on shall be deemed the jural consequence of the earlier discharge. He has broken the chain of causation, and loss resulting to him thereafter is suffered under his own act. McClelland, supra, at 359. We conclude that because Steranko failed in his duty to mitigate damages the judges award of 3,500 was error. Damages for Inforex. As stated earlier, 2,000 of Sterankos shares which were not part of the employment agreement remained restricted until July 8, 1973, despite the breach of contract by Inforex. Under the employee stock restriction agreement (see n.2, supra) Inforex was entitled to repurchase these shares for twenty-five cents a share within sixty days of Sterankos discharge if Steranko were discharged for cause. Inforex did in fact demand that he return these with his remaining shares on November 29, 1971. Steranko refused. Since in our view Sterankos discharge was justified by his refusal to assign his patent rights to M-297, we hold that under the employee stock restriction agreement he was obligated to turn over the 2,000 shares to Inforex on demand. That agreement provided that it was to be governed by Massachusetts law. Under our law Inforex is entitled to damages for the diminution in value of the stock in addition to specific performance. George v. Coolidge Bank Trust Co. 360 Mass. 635. 641 (1971). The measure is the difference between the fair market value at the time Steranko refused to return the stock (less twenty-five cents a share) and the fair market value on the date judgment shall enter ordering delivery of the 2,000 shares to Inforex. Ibid. We leave it to the trial judge to compute the damages owed Inforex by Steranko and to deduct that sum from the amount owed Steranko by Inforex for its refusal to release the restrictions on 22,200 of his remaining shares. Personal Liability of Horgan. Steranko seeks damages against Horgan individually claiming intentional interference with Sterankos contractual relationship with Inforex. The judge found only that Horgans actions toward Steranko were not a result of malevolence or malice. The judge drew no conclusion from that finding. In the absence of legal justification, intentional interference with a contractual right by a party not privy to the contract is actionable by the party injured. Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Mfrs. Assn. 221 Mass. 554. 559 (1915). Caverno v. Fellows, 300 Mass. 331. 336-337 (1938). Owen v. Williams, 322 Mass. 356. 360 (1948). Backman v. Guiliano, 331 Mass. 231. 232 (1954). M. F. Roach Co. v. Provincetown, 355 Mass. 731. 732 (1969). If such interference is found to be intentional and without justification, it is malicious in law even though it arose from good motives and without express malice. Grammenos v. Zolotas, 356 Mass. 594. 597 (1970), and cases cited. A defendant may escape liability if the interference was privileged as part of his employment responsibilities. See Caverno, supra, at 337 Owen, supra, at 360. This rule has particular force as applied to corporate officers, since their freedom of action directed toward corporate purposes should not be curtailed by fear of personal liability. Avins, Liability for Inducing a Corporation to Breach its Contract, 43 Cornell L. Q. 55, 59 (1957). See Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N. C. 121, 132-134 (1964) Griswold v. Heat, Inc. 108 N. H. 119, 125 (1967) Nola v. Merollis Chevrolet Kansas City, Inc. 537 S. W. 2d 627, 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). However, to the extent that a defendant acts out of actual malevolence or malice, the privilege may be lost. See Holbrook v. Morrison, 214 Mass. 209. 211 (1913) Caverno, supra, at 336-337 Owen, supra, at 360, citing Restatement of Torts Section 766, comment m (1939). Because Horgans behavior toward Steranko occurred in the course of his duties as a corporate officer of Inforex, he enjoyed a qualified privilege against liability for interference with Sterankos contractual relationship with the corporation, subject, however, to defeasance if his conduct emanated from actual malevolence or malice. From our review of the voluminous record before us, we conclude that the judges finding with respect to Horgans conduct was not clearly erroneous and, therefore, that there is no personal liability on Horgans part for interference with Sterankos contractual relationship with the corporation. Liability of State Street Bank and Trust Co. Steranko asserts that under Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), art. 8, G. L.c. 106, Section 8, the bank, acting as transfer agent for Inforex stock, is jointly and severally liable with Inforex for its refusal on Inforexs instructions to remove the restrictions from Sterankos shares. To arrive at this conclusion, Steranko couples two sections of the code, Sections 8-401 (2) Note 18 and 8-406 (1). Note 19 At the outset we note that the purpose of Section 8-406 was to abrogate in situations to which it applies, the common law immunity previously enjoyed by transfer agents against suits for wrongful refusal to transfer stock. See Kenler v. Canal Natl. Bank, 489 F. 2d 482, 485, n.3 (1st Cir. 1973) Welland Inv. Corp. v. First Natl. Bank, 81 N. J. Super. 180, 187 (1963) comment 1 to Section 8-406 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 U. L.A. (Master Ed. 1976). However, we do not agree that the banks refusal to remove the restrictive legends from Sterankos shares qualifies as a refusal to register a transfer under the terms of Section 8-401 (2) so as to subject the bank to liability under Section 8-406 (1). See generally, Kenler, supra, at 485. The removal of the legend is the obvious first step in, and a necessary incident to the contemplated transfer of such stock (ibid.) but it is not the equivalent of the registration of a transfer. In view of our conclusion that this is not a situation to which the UCC applies, the bank retains its common law immunity against suits by injured shareholders. See First Circuit Review, Transfer Agents Liability to a Stockholder as Affected by The Uniform Commercial Code, 9 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 343, 347, n.15 (1975). It strikes us as being unduly harsh to require the bank, as transfer agent, faced with Sterankos request and Inforexs order, to refuse that request at its peril based upon its own determination whether Sterankos demotion or discharge entitled him to release of the restrictions on his shares, and to incur thereby full liability should a court, after litigation and an opportunity for deliberation, rule against the agents decision. See id. at 353. Contra, Comment, 18 Rutgers L. Rev. 1170, 1174 (1964). Thus we hold that Steranko is not entitled to damages from the bank. Note 20 We summarize our rulings as follows: 1. We agree with the judge that the employment agreement continued in effect after January 7, 1970, on a year to year basis. 2. We agree with the judge that Inforex breached its contract by demoting Steranko from his executive position but we hold that the breach occurred over the period of time from September, 1970, to May 19, 1971. 3. We disagree with his ruling that the stock restrictions were severable from the rest of the employment agreement and that they remained in effect despite the breach by Inforex. 4. We rule that Steranko did not waive his right to obtain release of the stock restrictions and that he was entitled to have the restrictions on 24,000 shares removed as a result of the breach. 5. We disagree with the judges conclusion, based on his finding that Steranko would not have sold the stock even if the restrictions had been lifted, that Sterenko was not entitled to damages from Inforex for the latters refusal to release the restrictions. 6. We rule that the damages are the difference between (a) the highest value of 22,200 shares of stock from January 7, 1972, to a reasonable time thereafter and (b) the value of the stock at the time of trial. 7. We find that after Steranko was demoted from his executive position as vice president in May, 1971, he continued to work on an at will basis. 8. We rule that Steranko was obligated, even as an employee at will, to assign his interest in the M-297 patent rights to Inforex, and we rule, although for different reasons than those of the judge, that Inforex is entitled to that assignment. 9. We rule that although Steranko might have been entitled to damages for lost salary had he resigned in May, 1971, his refusal to assign his M-297 patent rights in the context of his continued employment violated his duty to mitigate damages. Consequently, we reverse the judges ruling that Steranko was entitled to 3,500 for lost salary after his discharge in November, 1971. 10. We rule that Inforex is entitled to the return of the 2,000 shares purchased by Steranko under the employee stock restriction agreement as well as damages equal to the difference between the fair market value when Steranko refused to return them (less twenty-five cents a share) and the fair market value on the date judgment shall enter ordering delivery of the 2,000 shares. 11. We accept the judges finding with respect to Horgans conduct and rule that Horgan is not personally liable in damages to Steranko. 12. We rule that the bank is not liable to Steranko for its refusal to issue unrestricted stock certificates. Accordingly, the judgments are reversed and a new judgment is to be entered in each case in part as follows: (1) that the employment agreement remained in full force and effect from July 15, 1968, through January 7, 1970, and annually thereafter until May 19, 1971 (2) that James J. Steranko assign all his right, title and interest in M-297 to Inforex, Inc. (3) that James J. Steranko is the owner of 24,000 shares of Inforex, Inc. stock, free of restrictions imposed by the employment agreement and the stockholders agreement (4) that Inforex, Inc. direct State Bank and Trust Company to remove from the aforesaid shares all such restrictions and to transfer those shares forthwith to James J. Steranko (5) that James J. Steranko transfer to Inforex, Inc. 2,000 shares purchased by him pursuant to the employee stock restriction agreement of June 23, 1969. The cases are remanded to the Superior Court for computation of damages against Inforex consistent with this opinion for its wrongful refusal to authorize removal of the stock restrictions, less damages owed by Steranko for his wrongful refusal to resell his 2,000 shares purchased in accordance with the employee stock restriction agreement. The damages so computed are to be included in the new judgments. No costs are to be awarded to any party. Note 1 The second case is Inforex, Inc. vs. James J. Steranko and State Street Bank and Trust Co. (Steranko filed a counterclaim to this action in which International Business Machines Corp. IBM and Infobond Corp. Infobond were joined as third-party defendants. The counterclaim was dismissed against IBM pursuant to a stipulation of the parties. Infobond appealed from an interlocutory decree overruling its demurrer to Sterankos amended complaint. However, that appeal has not been argued before this court, nor did the judgment entered in the Superior Court make reference to Infobond.) The third case is that of James J. Steranko vs. Thomas B. Horgan, State Street Bank and Trust Company and Inforex, Inc. Note 2 A four-for-one split in April, 1969, increased the number of shares held by Steranko to 32,000. On May 16, 1969, Inforex released 8,000 of these shares from the resale restrictions. On June 23, 1969, Steranko purchased another 2,000 shares subject to similar restrictions set out in an Employee Stock Restriction Agreement, except that the repurchase price for these shares was twenty-five cents a share. Thus Sterankos total acquisition was 34,000 shares of which 26,000 were restricted when this dispute arose. Note 3 Section 12 of the employment agreement provided, inter alia, If, prior to the expiration of said five-year period, the Employee shall leave the employ of the Company for any reason, including without limitation any termination of this Agreement by the Company. but specifically excluding the death or permanent. disability of the Employee attested by competent medical evidence, the Company shall have an option exercisable within sixty days after the severance of such employment to purchase any or all shares of the Stock for a purchase price of 1 per share. All certificates representing shares of the Stock shall bear a legend referring to the restrictions on the transfer and disposition of the Stock and the Companys option to repurchase the Stock set forth in this Section 12. The stockholders agreement provided that if Steranko received a written offer from a third party to purchase his stock, Inforex would have an option to match the offer and repurchase the shares. That agreement was to be in effect for three years, until July 15, 1971. In light of the employment agreement which barred Steranko from selling or transferring his stock for five years, as long as the employment agreement remained in effect the stockholders agreement became ineffectual by the passage of time in the course of this dispute. Note 4 The Infobond process is an automated wiring process for connecting electronic components on a printed circuit board. The process makes use of the M-258, M-266 and M-297 inventions. Note 5 Horgan, the president of Inforex, testified that Sterankos refusal to assign his patent rights to M-297 was the sole reason for his discharge. Note 6 Inforex obtained an order restraining Steranko and the State Street Bank and Trust Company, the transfer agent for the stock, from disposing of or transferring any shares of Inforex stock issued to Steranko. This order was later modified and then dissolved when Inforex failed to post a bond. Note 7 1. That the Employment Agreement aforementioned be declared valid and in full force and effect in its entirety from July 15, 1968 through January 7, 1970. The judgment omitted the additional language of the judges finding and ruling numbered 39 as follows: and from year to year thereafter. 2. That James J. Steranko assign to Inforex all his right, title and interest in M-297. 3. That James J. Steranko be declared the owner of the 26,000 Inforex shares here in issue free of any and all restrictions imposed thereon pursuant to and in accordance with the Employment Agreement of July 15, 1968, the Stockholders Agreement of July 15, 1968, and the Employee Stock Restriction Agreement of June 23, 1969. 4. That Inforex andor the Bank remove from the aforesaid 26,000 shares any and all such restrictions and transfer said shares free and clear of these restrictions to James J. Steranko forthwith. 5. That James J. Steranko recover of Inforex the sum of 3,500.00 with interest thereon as provided by law. 6. No costs of action. Note 8 Inforex argues in effect that the term of employment cannot be renewed or extended by the conduct of the parties because section 17 of the employment agreement states that this Agreement may be amended, terminated or superseded only by an agreement in writing between the Company and the Employee. We hold, however, that a renewal or an extension is beyond the scope of section 17 and therefore need not be in writing. Note 9 Cases relied upon by Inforex are distinguishable. Van Der Veer v. Theile, 185 App. Div. 17 (N. Y. 1918), involved employment for an indefinite period with a qualified promise to guarantee employment for a year. Klein Inst. for Aptitude Testing, Inc. v. Kestin, 34 Misc. 2d 967 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1962), dealt with a contract providing for termination at will after a one-year period. However, the case arose on a motion to dismiss the complaint for legal insufficiency on its face, and did not confront the question whether the facts demonstrated a renewal of the employment agreement. Note 10 The judge found that in September, 1970, when Steranko was assigned to work full time on corporate planning for the proposed Infobond Company, he retained none of his previous manufacturing responsibilities, had no employees reporting to him, and no longer attended officers meetings. According to the judge, the breach occurred in December, 1970, when Steranko was assigned as consultant to the president of Infobond. The judge found that further degradations in Sterankos position occurred after December, 1970: his assignment to less desirable office space, his decreased secretarial services and, eventually, the denial of his reelection as vice president. Note 11 Had he quit, Steranko would have been faced with a dual problem. Not only would it have been his burden to show that he had been constructively discharged prior to his resignation by virtue of the change in his duties in violation of the employment agreement (see Karas v. H. R. Labs. Inc. 271 App. Div. 530 N. Y. 1946 cf. Merrill v. Wakefield Rattan Co. 1 App. Div. 118 N. Y. 1896 Levitz v. Robbins Music Corp. 6 App. Div. 2d 1027 N. Y. 1958 Laiken v. American Bank Trust Co. 34 App. Div. 2d 514 N. Y. 1970 contrast Molinar v. Western Elec. Co. 525 F. 2d 521, 527 1st Cir. 1975), but he would have faced as well the possibility that the court would find the stock limitation provisions of his contract to be severable and thus divest him of the stock despite the breach by Inforex. Note 12 We need not discuss whether the stock restrictions contained in the shareholders agreement were severable from the terms of the employment agreement because the shareholders agreement restrictions expired by their own terms on July 15, 1971, prior to Sterankos formal written demand that the restrictions be removed. Note 13 The trial judge ruled that Steranko was not entitled to any damages because the judge disbelieved Sterankos testimony that he would have sold the stock if the restrictions on the shares had been removed by July 15, 1973, the date on which the judge erroneously held the restrictions to have expired. (See p. 266, supra.) Also the judges finding that Steranko would not have sold his stock prior to July, 1973 (assuming that finding to be relevant to the issue of damages), was clearly erroneous. Sterankos attempts to have the restrictions on transfer removed, his obtaining of a no action letter from the Securities and Exchange Commission to facilitate a transfer, his sales in December, 1971, and January, 1972, of 6,500 shares which had earlier been released, and his testimony that after his discharge he needed capital for a new business venture are compelling evidence that Steranko would have sold the stock had the restrictions been removed. Note 14 Since it does not appear from the record that Steranko ever formally demanded release of the restrictions on the remainder of his shares, he is limited to damages on 22,200 shares. Note 15 Since New York law applies in this case only to the employment agreement and the stockholders agreement between Steranko and Inforex, Massachusetts law governs the resolution of an employers common law rights to inventions of his employees. New York law, however, would appear to compel the same result. Annin v. Wren, 8 N. Y. St. Rep. 852 (Sup. Ct. 1887). Cahill v. Regan, 5 N. Y. 2d 292, 296 (1959). Note 16 Cf. Jamesbury Corp. v. Worcester Valve Co. Inc. 443 F. 2d 205, 214 (1st Cir. 1971), which holds that common law principles are superseded when inventive rights are allocated by contract. But here, following Inforexs breach, when Steranko continued to work on an at will basis, common law principles became applicable. Note 17 In view of our conclusion that the employment agreement terminated upon Sterankos not being reelected vice president in May, 1971, the finding and ruling of the judge (numbered 41) that Sterankos discharge in November was not for cause, as defined in the employment agreement, becomes irrelevant. Since Sterankos employment was at will after Inforexs breach of contract, under common law principles Inforex had almost unbridled discretion to discharge him. Linscott v. Millers Falls Co. 316 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Mass. 1970), affd. 440 F. 2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. den. 404 U. S. 872 (1971). See Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404, 1405, 1416 (1967) Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 Va. L. Rev. 481, 482-488 (1976). Cf. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. 114 N. H. 130, 133 (1974). Had Steranko been discharged arbitrarily or maliciously, he might have been absolved of his duty to mitigate damages from Inforexs breach. The justifiable nature of the discharge abrogated his right to damages for that breach. Note 18 Section 8-401 (2), as appearing in St. 1957, c. 765, Section 1, provides: Where an issuer is under a duty to register a transfer of a security the issuer is also liable to the person presenting it for registration or his principal for loss resulting from any unreasonable delay in registration or from failure or refusal to register the transfer. Note 19 Section 8-406(1), as appearing in St. 1957, c. 765, Section 1, provides: Where a person acts as. transfer agent. for an issuer in the registration of transfers of its securities or in the issue of new securities or in the cancellation of surrendered securities. (b) he has with regard to the particular functions he performs the same obligation to the holder or owner of the security and has the same rights and privileges as the issuer has in regard to those functions. Note 20 Contrast Edina State Bank v. Mr. Steak, Inc. 487 F. 2d 640 (10th Cir.), cert. den. 419 U. S. 883 (1974) (transfer agent liable for refusal to transfer where alleged restrictions not noted on stock certificate) Welland, 81 N. J.Super. at 180 (transfer agent liable for refusal to register transfer upon orders of issuer). Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Trial Court Law Libraries. Questions about legal information Contact Reference Librarians.